The Modern Recess Appointment Tradition is Not Valuable

I hate to seem like a one trick pony, but this another post on the Recess Appointments Clause.  It is prompted by my co-blogger Mike Greve’s post in defense of the modern practice on recess appointments.  Mike writes:

I do think important interests are at stake . . .  The Constitution sets up rival, competing institutions—and, as a practical matter, compels them to cooperate. Sometimes, it prescribes the mode: bicameral approval, presentment (veto, override).  On a million other things, it does not. When coordination problems prove recurrent, the institutions will work out some mutually acceptable practice. Some practices shift and change over time; others become deeply entrenched. But so long as they work tolerably well and don’t violate the Constitution more or less plainly (and yes, that’s a matter of judgment), it’s rarely a good idea to upset them. The practice serves some institutional function and demand. When it’s  ruled out of bounds the institutions will have to find some other coordination mechanism. That’s always costly. It may be unsuccessful. And it may well be worse than what went before. Before running those risks (in the name of originalism or for other reasons), we should make quite sure that we’ve got it right.

This is an important objection – and it is held by many people – but I believe it is mistaken.  It is worth pointing out why.

There is, of course, a formal – that is, originalist – response to Mike’s point (which he references when he says the practice doesn’t “violate the Constitution more or less plainly).  If one looks at the D.C.’s opinion (and even more persuasively, if you will permit me to say it, my article), I think it is plain that the modern practice is unconstitutional.

But there is also a functional – that is, a public policy – response to Mike’s defense of the practice.  Mike makes the conservative point that the existing practice, no doubt, serves important interests of the different branches – we just don’t know exactly what they are.  But they were worked out by the beneficial process of adjustment and coordination.

Scholars have analyzed this process of mutual adjustment in the separation of powers context.  They have analyzed it in terms of the Coase Theorem.  If the initial assignment of powers is inferior from the different branches’s perspective, then they will enter into an implicit contract that rearranges the assignment to their mutual benefit.  Based on the Coase Theorem, the new arrangement will leave the different branches better off.  So what is the harm?

The problem is that the different branches are not the only ones affected by this deal.  There is also a third party – the people – who are potentially harmed by it.

In the case of the recess appointment tradition, one might infer that the Senate has traded its power of advice and consent to the President in exchange for something else.  We don’t really know what it gets in return.  One possibility is that the Senators don’t have to make difficult votes on controversial nominees that might harm them politically.  After all, the Congress often delegates power when they want to avoid responsibility.  In the modern era of minority party filibustering of nominations, the recess appointment power may allow the Senate to avoid having to engage in a divisive debate about filibuster reform, which might leave the filibuster weaker and individual Senators less powerful.

Notice, though, that these trades benefit the Senators but do not provide obvious benefits to the people or the republic.  But in all cases what the trade does is to undermine an important check – the constitutional requirement that Senate decide on whether officers should be appointed.

The bottom line is that there is not a good reason to believe that the practice of recess appointments serves the republic and quite a few reasons to think it does not.  By striking down that practice, the courts can help to force the Senate to serve its job as a check on potentially abusive executive power.

Mike Rappaport

Professor Rappaport is Darling Foundation Professor of Law at the University of San Diego, where he also serves as the Director of the Center for the Study of Constitutional Originalism. Professor Rappaport is the author of numerous law review articles in journals such as the Yale Law Journal, the Virginia Law Review, the Georgetown Law Review, and the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.  His book, Originalism and the Good Constitution, which is co-authored with John McGinnis, was published by the Harvard University Press in 2013.  Professor Rappaport is a graduate of the Yale Law School, where he received a JD and a DCL (Law and Political Theory).

About the Author

Comments

  1. Daniel J. Artz says

    Amen! The whole point of creating checks and balances in the Constitution was not to throw the different branches into the arena for the purpose of sport, or allow them to work out their differences in a manner which they found mutually beneficial. It was to protect We the People from a Government cursed, like all governments are, with an insatiable appetite for power. Requiring Presidential appointments to be confirmed by the Senate created a check on an Executive Branch looking (as it always is) for ways to enlarge its scope of influence. Expanding the Recess Appointment clause to go far beyond the safety valve for emergencies that it was intended to be seriously dilutes this check on Executive power, at the expense of the People.

  2. says

    Well said. I’d simply the argument even further: The dissent’s position, that the public was getting cheated in the past, so we should allow them to get cheated in the future, is disrespectful to past citizens (pretending it was always ok), present citizens (who took time to study who to vote for), and the infinite unborn citizens otherwise forced to endure the potential injustice caused by congress not watching the executive branch in the fashion advertised by the constitution.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

You may use these HTML tags and attributes: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <strike> <strong>