The South Was Right, the Historians Are Wrong: Taking the Antislavery Origins of the Civil War Seriously

Why did the Southern states choose to secede when Abraham Lincoln was elected president in November of 1860? At the time, Southerners attributed “secession winter” to the fear that Lincoln and the Republicans fully intended to make war on slavery, bypassing the Constitution, which left the issue of slavery to the states. Thus, they believed, their only option was to separate from the Union.

Northern Democrats agreed, contending that Republicans intended to circumvent the Constitution’s prohibition against direct federal action against slavery. Agitation by the “Black Republicans” was responsible for the crisis. The Democrats felt vindicated when Republicans refused to compromise on the extension of slavery into the territories. In addition, the Democrats charged, the Republicans intended to refuse to enforce the fugitive slave law that had been passed in 1850 as part of the Great Compromise.

No serious historian still denies that the Southern states seceded in order to protect slavery but most argue that Lincoln and the Republicans entered upon war with no intention of attacking slavery, noting that Lincoln said so himself. According to the standard narrative, the Union turned to emancipation only reluctantly as a means to advance the Union war effort.

Of course, they are correct to point out that the Republicans denied any intention to interfere with slavery where it existed. Lincoln addressed the point directly in his inaugural speech. But it is also true that he would brook no compromise in the extension of slavery. As he wrote to James T. Hale on January 11, 1861, “we have just carried an election on principles fairly stated to the people. Now we are told in advance, the government must be broken up, unless we surrender to those we have beaten, before we take the offices…[I]f we surrender, it is the end of [the Republican Party] and of the government. They will repeat the experiment upon us ad libitum. A year will not pass, till we shall have to take Cuba as a condition upon which they will stay in the Union.”

Many historians have concluded that if the North was not motivated by any substantial antislavery convictions, then the Civil War cannot be justified morally. Why fight a war the purpose of which was only to restore the Union if emancipation was only an accidental byproduct?

Freedom NationalIn his remarkable new book, Freedom National: The Destruction of Slavery in the United States, 1861-1865, James Oakes argues that the historians who deny the antislavery origins of the war are mistaken. He contends that from the outset, Republicans had slavery in their sights. Southerners understood that the antislavery threat to the South was real. Accordingly, secession was not an hysterical overreaction to Lincoln’s election but an understandable response to the fact that an antislavery majority in the North had elected an antislavery president. And indeed, Oakes contends, from the very beginning of the conflict, the Republicans worked assiduously to destroy slavery. The problem with the dominant narrative, he argues, is that too many historians have refused to take the Republicans at their word.

Oakes expands the work of Allen Guelzo, who in Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America, argued that from the first day of his presidency, Lincoln had his eye firmly set on ending slavery. Oakes takes nothing away from Lincoln, but demonstrates that Lincoln’s approach was reflective of the Republican Party as a whole. While there were many differences between Lincoln and the Radicals within the Republican Party, they were of far less import than those between the Democrats and the Republicans. As Lincoln himself once remarked, the difference between Charles Sumner, the Radical Republican senator from Massachusetts, and himself was six weeks.

The Republican Party grew out of the anger generated in both the Whig and Democratic Parties by the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, which repealed the Missouri Compromise prohibiting the expansion of slavery into the territories formed out of the old Louisiana Purchase that lay north of Missouri. But the Republicans inherited a coherent set of antislavery principles formulated long before the Nebraska controversy. Oakes traces the evolution of this antislavery consensus and shows how it shaped the policies of the Lincoln administration and Congress toward slavery once the war began.

The antislavery consensus that underpinned the Republican Party was based on a number of principles: 1) that the Founding generation suffused the Constitution with the principles of natural law and the law of nations, which held that man’s natural condition is freedom: the Constitution is inseparable from Declaration of Independence; 2) that the presumption of freedom recognized by the Constitution could be overridden only by local or municipal law—in other words freedom was “national,” holding sway wherever the Constitution was sovereign, e.g. in the Federal territories and on the high seas, while slavery was “local,” limited to state jurisdiction; 3) that while the Constitution placed slavery in the states where it existed beyond the reach of the federal government, the Constitution did enable the Federal Government to limit the expansion of slavery; 4) that the slavery compromises of the Federal Constitution never included the idea that slaves were property—there could be no such thing as “property in man. ”

Republicans firmly believed that these principles provided the basis for a Federal assault on slavery once Lincoln and a Republican Congress took office, notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution prohibited the Federal government from interfering with slavery in the states where it existed. Just as Southern secessionists and Northern Democrats had argued, Republicans intended to ban slavery from all the western territories, abolish slavery in Washington, D.C., withdraw federal protection of slavery on the high seas, and deny admission to any new slave states. Many Republicans, if not necessarily Lincoln, also intended to prohibit federal enforcement of the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution

If the slave states remained in the Union, Republicans believed that this approach would permit the Federal Government to construct a “cordon of freedom” around the slave states that would bring about what Lincoln called the “ultimate extinction” of slavery. They assumed that because slavery was intrinsically weak this cordon of freedom would ultimately strangle slavery, forcing the slave states themselves to abolish the institution on their own.

The Republican logic of 1860 held that abolition would begin in the northernmost slaves states—Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri—where slavery was weakest. As more free states joined the Union and as more slave states abandoned the institution, slavery would wither and die. Despite Southern objections, Republicans contended that such a policy did not violate the Constitution’s ban on direct federal “interference” with slavery in the states where it already existed.

But secession by the slave states opened the way for another means to attack slavery: immediate, uncompensated military emancipation in the disloyal states, justified under the war powers of the Constitution. For many years, the official US position had been just the opposite. While European writers such as Emmerich de Vattel and Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui argued that it was permissible to seize the private property of the enemy during wartime, Americans had demurred, arguing that it was impermissible for an enemy to seize private property, especially slaves, contending that to do so was to incite servile insurrection.

Indeed, John Quincy Adams had made precisely this argument when he was secretary of state during the Monroe administration, demanding that the British return slaves they had emancipated during the War of 1812. But his views changed. Adam’s argument before the Supreme Court in the Amistad case became the basis for the idea that although the federal government could not abolish slavery in a state, it could emancipate slaves in any state that was in rebellion against the United States.

Thus, states that remained loyal during the Rebellion would be provided the opportunity to accept peaceful, gradual, compensated abolition of slavery. But secession meant a war of rebellion, and such a war meant immediate, uncompensated military emancipation. Although Republicans understood that the only constitutional justification for prosecuting the war was to restore the Union, they also recognized that the effect of the war would be the destruction of slavery, an outcome that they welcomed. Of course, they understood that military emancipation had its limits: although it could free individual slaves, it could not end slavery itself.

Oakes demonstrates how the Lincoln administration, Congress, the War Department, and the slaves themselves worked in tandem from the very beginning of the war to attack slavery. Indeed, the Republican’s antislavery policy was based on the assumption that the slaves hated slavery and would take advantage of the war to claim their freedom. Hundreds of thousands did.

The Union attack on slavery began as early as May of 1861 with Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler’s contraband policy and continued with the passage of the two confiscation acts passed by Congress in 1861 and 1862, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, and the enlistment of black soldiers in the Union army. It culminated with the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which finally drove a stake through the heart of the institution.

As noted above, Republicans had always believed that emancipation would occur first in the loyal slave states and that this dynamic would put pressure on the rebelling states. Oakes argues that in fact the reverse was the case. As Oakes notes, the loyal slave states resisted federal pressure against slavery rather than quickly surrendering to abolition. By 1862 Lincoln and the Republicans in Congress were losing patience with the loyal slave states and by 1863 the Union army was actively impressing slaves from loyal masters in these states and guaranteeing the freedom of enlistees from the loyal slave states, as well as that of their families.

When the war began, Republicans believed that slavery was inherently weak and that it would collapse under the twin pressures of voluntary emancipation in the loyal slave states and military emancipation in the Rebel states. But as Frederick Douglass observed, slavery was “the stomach” of the rebellion and indeed, it proved a hard nut to crack, especially once the South instituted a “counter-revolution of property” policy that was severe, violent, and bloody in response to the federal attack on slavery. Thus there were limits to what military emancipation could accomplish.

Lincoln’s reelection in 1864 ensured that the Union would be restored but not necessarily that slavery would be destroyed. Republicans believed that neither military emancipation nor state abolitionism would be enough to end slavery. That would require a constitutional amendment. Given the increased Republican majorities in both houses of Congress, passage of such an amendment would be assured when the Thirty-Ninth Congress (elected in November of 1864) opened in December of 1865, but Lincoln and the Republicans feared that if the war ended before abolition was secure, the Democrats’ charge that the Republicans had always used “military necessity” as an excuse to mask their “fanatical determination to destroy slavery” would seem to be validated. If Republicans continued to press for abolition once peace was restored, they would lose their most politically potent justification for the amendment. This accounts for the push to have the Thirty-Eighth Congress to pass the amendment in January of 1865.

Oakes’ great achievement is to demonstrate that Lincoln and the Republican Party adopted a strong antislavery policy from the beginning of the secession crisis and advanced it as the war progressed. It is important to remember that emancipation did not begin on January, 1863. It had been underway since May of 1861, a mere month after the rebellion began. Lincoln was hardly a “reluctant” emancipator, but neither did he act entirely on his own, but always in accordance with the principles of the Republican Party.

Today we often act as if the destruction of slavery in the United States was inevitable. But as Oakes makes clear, slavery was too strong to be destroyed by the war alone, as the Republicans believed in 1861. It took not only a full-scale war but also a constitutional amendment to finally destroy it. No one could be reasonably sure that would happen until Lincoln and the Republicans won the elections in November of 1864.

Mackubin Thomas Owens is currently professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College and also editor of Orbis, the quarterly journal of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

About the Author

Comments

  1. Ron Johnson says

    I’ve always thought Lincoln essentially honest. Assuming that to be true, he expressly articulated his view of the purpose and importance of the war in his Gettysburg address (an extension of concepts found in his Lyceum speech). Obviously, just as today Americans took many different positions on the war, a complex issue. Like today the political and rhetorical temperature had reached the boiling point such that no one trusted anyone. Lincoln would even question whether the political views of his mainly Democratic generals, many of whom were expressly NOT fighting for “niggers,” was the main cause of their lack of aggression on the battlefield. If the book is as described, it is too one-dimensional.

  2. John Ashman says

    Which historians? The book as described seems to take essentially the conventional historian path, so I’m a bit confused.

  3. Kevin R. Hardwick says

    John has it pretty much exactly right. For starters, we should note that the two authors mentioned by name in the post, Guelzo and Oates, are both historians. So pretty clearly, Owens here is not talking about ALL historians. He is talking about SOME historians, presumably those whose arguments Guelzo and Oates are concerned to modify or refute.

    Author writes: “According to the standard narrative, the Union turned to emancipation only reluctantly as a means to advance the Union war effort.”

    This is a pretty important sentence, since it is the basis for author’s claim that the interpretation of Oates and Guelzo represents a radical departure from the currently dominant position–assuming, of course, that there *is* a currently dominant interpretation. Owens, however, provides us no additional information, so he is leaving us to take his word for it that a.) there does exist a single dominant interpretation to which most living historians adhere, and b.) that his characterization of this position is accurate. Since this is such an important point–without it, Owen’s argument loses much of its claim to our attention in this forum–it is a striking omission, and one that weakens the force of his argument.

    I should add that I think Owens does an admirable job summarizing (some of) the main points of Oate’s book–and further, that I agree with him that Oate’s book is well worth reading. The place where he and I part company is in his asssessment of the historiographic importance of Oates’ book. He needs to do a fair bit more work in order to make his argument stick.

    Thus, Owens is unconvincing in his claim that Oates (and Guelzo) represent an important paradigm shift in historical interpretation. It is possible that they do–that will be determined by seeing what future historians do with their work. To my eye (borrowing a phrase from Thomas Kuhn) Oates is writing “normal history,” that extends and develops incrementally the scholarship of earlier scholars like Ira Berlin (whose essay “The Wartime Destruction of Slavery” in the volume on military matters from the FREEDOM AND SOUTHERN SOCIETY PROJECT remains necessary reading) and Eric Foner.

    Owens also minimizes or neglects important evidence. Sure, some Union military officers tried to emancipate southern slaves immediately, from pretty much the beginning of the war. But it surely matters that the Lincoln administration took prompt and careful action to repudiate these efforts, and to protect the property rights of southerns in, among other things, human property.

    That said, however, the argument that 1.) Southern statesmen were afraid that Lincoln and his administration would take steps to “strangle” slavery in the states in which it was legal; and 2.) there was some grounds for this fear–that it was not entirely imaginary; is, I think, pretty uncontroversial. I find it hard to imagine that many of my colleagues in my own department or elsewhere would wish to deny either of these propositions. If that is so, what is the controversy here?

    All best wishes,
    Kevin

    • John Ashman says

      Kevin, what’s the phrase? “A difference without a distinction”?

      “but most argue that Lincoln and the Republicans entered upon war with no intention of attacking slavery, noting that Lincoln said so himself. According to the standard narrative, the Union turned to emancipation only reluctantly as a means to advance the Union war effort. Of course, they are correct to point out that the Republicans denied any intention to interfere with slavery where it existed. Lincoln addressed the point directly in his inaugural speech. But it is also true that he would brook no compromise in the extension of slavery. ”

      IOW “Historians have it wrong, except that they have it right, but, maybe a just little wrong….but not much”

      I don’t think any of this has ever been seriously debatable, it’s just how you spin it and the schools simply teach that the Civil War [which wasn't a civil war] was fought over elimination of slavery [except it wasn't] and that was the dominating reason for war [when in reality it was just an ancillary].

      It is the same with the Iraq war. It was fought over WMD. Period. Except that there were other reasons, the intransigence of Saddam Hussein to follow the ceasefire agreement, and to free millions of people from tyranny by a dictator [though that had terrible consequence]. Those that simply history will say one thing, those that don’t will generally agree on deeper and diverse rationales, as with the [non] Civil War™.

      • Kevin R. Hardwick says

        John–

        You are right in a narrow sense–there were many issues involved in the politics that created the war. But slavery was implicated in most of them–states rights, tariff politics, the war with Mexico and its aftermath, the expansion of slavery into the western territories, the repeal of the Missouri compromise, the civic status of free blacks (citizen, or non-citizen?). All of these disputes had resonance in the decision to secede, and in the decisions of the Lincoln administration about how best to respond.

        Generally speaking, I think we are well advised, when we want to know why statesmen do something, to take a hard look at why they say they are doing it. As we know, this is a procedure that must be used cautiously, since statesmen are not always overt in their agendas. But its a good rule of first aproximation. Here, the debates over secession are quite revealing. A book you may find worth consulting on this issue–I recommend it more broadly, but especially to John, because I think he will find it interesting and fun to read–is Charles B. Dew, APOSTLES OF DISUNION: SOUTHERN SECESSION COMMISIONERS AND THE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR (2002). Charles Dew, of course, is an historian–so presumaby one of the people whose scholarship Dr. Owens writes to condemn (his title, after all, implies that ALL historians, including Oates and Guelzo, are wrong headed). But read it for yourself, and see if you think Owens is correct. (Hint: He isn’t.) Good book–I recommend it.

        • Kevin R. Hardwick says

          I left an important observation out. Dew’s book, written in 2002, is in my view pretty representative of the current orthodoxy among historians (to the extent, anyway, that an orthodoxy exists). Read the squib about it on Amazon, and then read Owens, above, and then ask yourself if there is any meaningful difference between the two arguments. If Dew’s argument is orthodox–and it is a well received book that is widely taught to undergraduates, so if its not orthodox, its pretty close–then what should we make of Owen’s argument above. Owens gets all the details right, and draws precisely the wrong conclusion. Oates is not paving new ground–he is extending and synthesizing the arguments of an entire generation of historians like Dew, whose arguments are already very well received.

          Again–what’s the issue here?

          • John Ashman says

            Hi Kevin,

            Sorry, I don’t buy that concept. Here’s one reason. There is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits it, just a mere implication at best. Further, no contract can be enforced if all sides don’t abide by it, and the Feds certainly don’t do that. SCOTUS had no power to tell Texas it couldn’t leave.

            But more than that. Imagine if the Constitution had said that under no circumstance may a state secede from the union. How many do you believe would sign it? More than a few? Certainly not all 13. One cannot make the leap that “we left it unsaid to make it signable, and therefore, it’s enforceable”. Leaving the union means losing the support and protection of the union, the trade benefits and all of that, it’s not something a state would do lightly, but some did, and it was perfectly Constitutional, no matter what SCOTUS says, because the power isn’t in the Constitution. How would such a thing be enforced? By an invasion. So, by signing the paper, you’re agreeing in advance to a wife beating of epic proportion. You can’t enforce a marriage by force, you can’t enforce a union by force.

        • John Ashman says

          Kevin, I think it depends on whether you believe that secession caused the war. I don’t believe it did. Slavery did cause secession, but the war was for reintegration of the states by force, not because of slavery. That slavery was used by the North in limited amounts to bring certain elements into the arena of war supporters is pretty obvious. “We need to bring these people back into the union and…..btw….slavery will suffer for it”. I just don’t draw a direct line between secession over slavery directly to war over slavery because it avoids the intermediary step where the North provoked war to rationalize a war of conquest.

          • Kevin R. Hardwick says

            John–

            You are correct, of course. Once the South seceded, Lincoln and his administration had to decide what to do. The proximate cause of the outbreak of war was Lincoln’s decision to retain federal property in the South, including most prominently the series of Federal defenses created after the War of 1812.

            Can you sketch a scenario after secession in which violence did not ensue?

            Lincoln justified the war as an effort to maintain the Union. Preservation of the Union was, after all, the primary purpose of the Federal Constitution, which of course secession, if permitted to succeed, would destroy. If the Federal Constitution is a good thing, opposition to secession strikes me as a necessary consequence.

            All best,
            Kevin

        • John Ashman says

          I have to break with you on the secession thing. I think it is an absolutely crucial check towards government breaking the bargain called the Constitution. If the Feds have the ability to break the Constitution at will, and they obviously do, secession is a strong counter balance. Better 50 free states than one tyrannical country.

          Further, had I been Lincoln, I would have immediately pulled the troops with the permission and full awareness of the South, I’d have arranged personally for a meeting to arrange a compromise and leave the door open for reintegration of any state who wishes to rejoin and bid everyone who does not a good and healthy life. Obviously, trade pacts would have had to been worked out. This would have saved a million lives, would have resulted in the peaceful demise of slavery, would have been far better for today’s blacks, who would have not have had to suffer through the passive aggressive anger of Southerners. It may have been expedient to say “Slavery is wrong, but we have no power to stop you from engaging in it”, but it would have created a far better outcome. I don’t see what we have today as a good outcome at all, for anyone.

          It’s not that the Constitution isn’t a good thing, but how it is applied is often quite evil and totalitarian in nature.

          • Kevin R. Hardwick says

            John–

            We may be speaking past each other. I don’t have an opinion one way or the other re the theoretical contribution that secession might provide to checks the federal government. Unilateral secession was found unconstitutional in Texas v. White in 1869, and thus is not a legal option at present. But whether that is a good or bad thing will require wiser counsel than mine.

            I am asserting an historical fact that I think is pretty uncontroversial: the founders engaged in the project to create something better than the Articles because they worried that the federal government provided by the Articles was too weak to maintain the union. In this sense, the whole point of the Constitution is to create a federal government strong enough to prevent secession.

          • Kevin R. Hardwick says

            Or, to put this somewhat differently: if we believe in originalism, then we also believe that secession is a bad thing. For guys like James Madison, much of the impetus to create a “more perfect union” stemmed from the perception that under the articles, it was very likely that the Union would soon break into what Madison referred to as “regional” or “partial confederations.” Madison, and many others among the founders, feared that possibility for what most scholars today consider to have been sound reasons of state. This was one of the evils that the Constitution was designed to mitigate.

        • John Ashman says

          I meant to put this post here –

          Hi Kevin,

          Sorry, I don’t buy that concept. Here’s one reason. There is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits it, just a mere implication at best. Further, no contract can be enforced if all sides don’t abide by it, and the Feds certainly don’t do that. SCOTUS had no power to tell Texas it couldn’t leave.

          But more than that. Imagine if the Constitution had said that under no circumstance may a state secede from the union. How many do you believe would sign it? More than a few? Certainly not all 13. One cannot make the leap that “we left it unsaid to make it signable, and therefore, it’s enforceable”. Leaving the union means losing the support and protection of the union, the trade benefits and all of that, it’s not something a state would do lightly, but some did, and it was perfectly Constitutional, no matter what SCOTUS says, because the power isn’t in the Constitution. How would such a thing be enforced? By an invasion. So, by signing the paper, you’re agreeing in advance to a wife beating of epic proportion. You can’t enforce a marriage by force, you can’t enforce a union by force.

        • says

          Actually there was only one issue of RELEVANCE in the “war-” the legal issue; and the American states were individually sovereign– not collectively; this is a plain fact of law, history and intent.
          Avoiding this issue, serves only to deny it by changing the subject; and thus presume that the North acted legally– thus making the secession indeed an act of “rebellion.”
          However that’s not what happened, and so this can be disregarded as a stalling-tactic.

  4. Kevin R. Hardwick says

    Addendum: apologies in advance. I used the word “author,” as I would in an academic peer review, in place of the author’s name (“Owens”) as a placeholder–and I see now that when I went back through to replace the one with the other, I did not manage to catch all of them. I intend no disrespect at all to Dr. Owens, and sincerely hope none is taken.

  5. johnt says

    I haven’t read the posts with diligence, but I will assume that someone mentions John C Calhoun. Calhoun’s arguments on the Constitution and States Rights strike me as irrefutable. How is it that an entity which created a a founding document, binds itself in perpututity to that document? And where does it say that having once agreed to it you are bound forever to it? It doesn’t, it can’t, the South was right.
    Whatever Lincoln wanted he preempted any hope of reconcilliation or other alternatives than war. 600,000 dead, destroyed bodies and minds uncountable.

  6. says

    An apologist’s argument typically avoids the key issue by putting the victim on trial; and here, the author does just that from square 1, avoiding the key issue of secession-rights, in favor of standard propaganda “history.”
    Lincoln prefaced his invasion with a completely bogus version of American history, similar to Saddam Hussein’s version– i..e.where the law gave him the authority he claimed– while that’s not the way it really happened.
    Long story short, the states of the US had the same right to secede, as the states of the UN; and by avoiding;ignoring this topic, the author simply sweeps it under the rug, in order to deny clear culpability, calling it a “civil war” instead of an outright international invasion….. i.e. a LIE.
    And I believe we have enough of that.

  7. TexasDude says

    Reading the Federalist Papers should have put to rest this question of secession. We all know that the Civil War finally did, but it is apparent some still think that it was an illegal war of Northern Aggression (oxymoronic in my humble opinion). Those that supported a vigorous and strong national government (note, I mean in that time frame, not today’s), fully believed that secession was the bane to civil good governmnet. They made it clear that our current constitution was created in an attempt to prevent secession and the natural tendencies of democracies. Granted, I am just blue coller worker in North Texas with only a BBA and not an intellectual PHD of some sort, but I find it odd that the words of those that trumpeted our constitution appear to be ignored or, at the least, muted to the point of nothingness by some. I believe Madison stated something to the effect that the reason that secession wasn’t addressed is because the proposed constitution would prevent that. Subsidiarity is the key concept of the constitution and so is solidarity. While those two terms have Catholic meanings, they are clearly what our Founders designed and intended with the design of the Constitution and its intertwining of individual, state, and national interests and powers. If one truly believes that the states of right to secede, then the flip side is that the national government had the power to keep the states in. You can’t have our cake and eat it too on this.

  8. Colonel Sanders says

    The essay is so fundamentally wrong, it is almost beyond belief. As just a brief example, the claim that the Declaration and the Constitution are “inseparable” is stunning in its sheer absurdity. The Declaration was written in 1776 for the purpose of publicly justifying an illegal and traitorous secession. The Constitution, written over 11 years later in 1787, was written to establish the fundamental law of the land. Of course in the meantime, the Articles of Condeferation was adopted, then abandoned. If they were “inseparable”, they would have been written and promulgated simultaneously. The fact is, they have absolutely nothing to do with each other.

  9. Jake says

    The first American Revolutionary War had a lot more to do with slavery than the second (failed) War of American Secession. No slaves were freed in Union Territory until the young republic was completely vanquished. In short it was a war between two slave countries.

Trackbacks

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

You may use these HTML tags and attributes: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <strike> <strong>