Those of us who believe in the rule of law and limited government are understandably flummoxed by the conclusion of the Supreme Court’s 2014-15 term: in rapid succession, and generally by narrow margins, the Court “fixed” an internal defect in the ObamaCare statute (King v. Burwell); recognized so-called “disparate impact” claims under the Federal Housing Act (Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.); created a constitutional right to same-sex marriage and struck down contrary state laws (Obergefell v. Hodges); and re-wrote the “elections clause” of Article I, section 4 to allow non-legislative redistricting (Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission).
I am excited to announce that Mark Pulliam will blog for us in July as Michael Greve returns to Germania for the month. Mark's first contribution to the site was on race and cronyism at the University of Texas. I think it's safe to assume that he'll have more to say on this topic. Mark is a writer living in Austin. After graduating from the University of Texas School of Law, he clerked for Judge Walter Ely on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and then practiced law for 30 years with the firm of Latham & Watkins, specializing in labor…
Many supporters of a policy of same-sex marriage, and even many supporters of a constitutional right to same-sex marriage—there is a difference—have felt compelled to disavow the shoddy analysis-cum-emotivism by which Justice Kennedy imposed that conclusion. What the euphoria over newly released Supreme Court decisions seems always to obscure is that the same method will be available to other jurists in other cases. Conclusions reached in future may not be so agreeable to those celebrating Obergefell v. Hodges today.
Randy Barnett and Ed Whelan have revived the supremacy debate in the wake of the Chief Justice’s opinions in King and Obergefell, with Barnett arguing most recently that judges should be guided by the “constraint” of the text rather than “deference,” both of which he classifies as forms of restraint. Much commends that notion, and the distinction is analytically useful. But in the course of embracing a particular strain of originalism, it finds itself in tension with the original understanding of the judges’ role. Barnett’s standard for judicial nominees is a “proven record of willingness to be constrained by the original…
Even for those who have not been through an undergraduate academic program, the figure of the biased historian is well known. In the hands of biased historians, the past morphs into an ideological axe to grind. Methodology is the tool that forces the facts to conform to their theory, and that jettisons any stray facts that don’t fit.
But this was not always so. Once upon a time, there were historians whose intellectual probity led them to follow the evidence no matter where it led, even if it damaged their own “side.” Professor Allen Weinstein belonged to this almost extinct group. Weinstein, who taught at Smith College, Georgetown, and Boston University, and who was for three years the National Archivist in Washington, died last week at 77.
I am a strong opponent of Obamacare. But once I realized that a decision in King v. Burwell denying subsidies to people who purchase insurance under the federal exchanges would not help the cause of repealing Obamacare and might hurt it, my attitude towards the case changed. I felt much less politically invested in the issue and could more easily view it in an impartial manner.
Thus, I read with a relatively open mind the opinions by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia in the case. Although I am a formalist (albeit a soft formalist), I do believe that conflicting provisions in a statute can render it ambiguous and that purpose is permissibly used to resolve an ambiguity – two key premises of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion. But in the end, I concluded that Justice Scalia had the better of the argument by a significant margin.
Many things will be said in the coming days about the Supreme Court’s holding in Obergefell v. Hodges, better known as the same-sex marriage case. I don’t think I can in general improve upon the dissents written by the four Supreme Court justices—who object to the sweeping and poorly reasoned argument offered by Justice Anthony Kennedy as the “reasoned judgment” of a “bare majority” of his colleagues. But I think I have something to add to the discussion regarding Kennedy’s understanding of his role as a Supreme Court justice.
While many have celebrated the result in Obergefell v. Hodges, fewer have praised the craftsmanship of Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion. That is as it should be because the opinion is longer on sentiment and empathy than legal analysis. And yet it is now as much a part of the United States Reporter as the most well-reasoned judgment. Thus, it is worth looking at its doctrinal implications, none of which are happy.
First, Kennedy consciously removes the historical constraints on the Court’s ability to declare new fundamental rights. Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), the most important modern substantive due process case, required fundamental rights to be deeply rooted in the history and tradition of America. Whatever else can be said about it, same-sex marriage does not begin to meet that test. Kennedy says correctly that some other substantive due process cases did not meet that test either (Roe comes obviously to mind). While Kennedy does not quite say that he is overruling Glucksberg altogether, its relevance has been gravely weakened. Justices seem free to look to their views on the nature of justice rather than history to discern new fundamental rights.
While some libertarians in the past have been enthusiastic about this development, it is unlikely the Court will use this power to pursue economic liberties. I think this development is likelier to revive claims that some other social rights, like the right to assisted suicide, are also constitutional ones.
Kennedy also gestured to the equal protection clause in his decision.
I spent most of my post-King yesterday trying 1) to suspend disbelief; 2) suppress laughter; and 3) explain this to my kids. Epic fail at all fronts. My hunch, or at any rate my fear, is that this will turn out very badly for the Chief—an honorable man, and a capable jurist who really should know better.
Taxi drivers in France rioted yesterday to prevent Uber from competing with them. They attacked vehicles on the mere suspicion that they were working for that company. They broke windows on cars carrying tourists. It was a kind of economic terrorism. Even a left-liberal rock star was upset!
France is one of the most heavily regulated and centralized states in the Western world. But Uber represents the new forces of decentralizing competition that it may ultimately be powerless to block. While the French government appeared to take the side of the violent strikers today, it will have difficulty in stopping this kind of competition without deploying coercion unacceptable in a democratic society.
Uber is essentially an app that connects people who want to make a mutually beneficial transaction. Other apps will connect those who want to make other transactions—for plumbing, gardening or housework. These services will be less expensive than current services, whose cost is inflated by regulations, not least of which are those designed to protect incumbents.