Yesterday, the Hoover Institution hosted a conference on “A Better Way,” the House Republicans’ agenda to make America perhaps not great again but at least work again. That proved a useful focus for a panel discussion featuring yours truly (video link to come). As for ABW itself, I’m with the Boss: Well my soul checked out missing as I sat listening To the hours and minutes tickin' away Yeah just sittin' around waitin' for my life to begin While it was all just slippin' away The fact is that ABW is dead for the foreseeable future. Mr. Trump has severely compromised, if not single-handedly destroyed,…
In my previous post, I talked about how delegation came to dominate our government. I focused on two types of delegation – delegation of policymaking discretion and delegation of legal interpretation, such as Chevron deference.
I suggested that Chevron was a disaster, because it greatly added to the delegations that had already occurred though congressional statutes. The courts could have simply enforced those congressional delegations without adding to them with Chevron. But instead they invented Chevron – which had not been enacted by Congress – and greatly expanded the delegations.
Chevron was also a disaster in another way. One might believe that Republicans are generally more in favor of limited government than Democrats these days, especially as to government regulation. This is not an uncontroversial judgment, but I believe it is largely correct. And if that is so, then the Republican judges of the 1980s undermined their cause when they pushed Chevron. Chevron allowed administrative agencies significantly more authority to enact regulations.
The Supreme Court is lost. Sunday night’s debate settled that. The question now is not how to save the Court but rather how to navigate an adverse one, and the answer is to deprive it of power.
A good explanation of the Clinton-Trump clash we are living through, and of Trump’s having taken the Republican Party by storm, is in Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule’s 2010 brief for executive supremacy as the way we do constitutionalism. The Posner-Vermeule thesis in The Executive Unbound is that the Madisonian philosophy of separation of powers as a constraint on the presidency no longer exists, and good riddance. The more authoritative check on executive power, they say, is majority opinion and the fact that the President must face the voters every four years. This, and not Greg Weiner’s paean to Jemmy Madison, is the only source we have now for safe, effective, and informally limited government. Those wanting Madison on demand, Posner and Vermeule inform us, are whistling past the graveyard of a constitutionalism that no longer fits this American nation.
In this year’s presidential campaign, it would be a wonderful contribution to the republic and perhaps a winning move to run credibly on a rule of law platform. This kind of platform is to be distinguished from a “law and order” one, because it emphasizes that in a well-ordered republic that government must enforce order only through law. And this slogan also underscores that the problem we face is not simply or indeed mainly lawlessness on the streets, but lawlessness in government. Respect for law must begin at the top.
Now that Donald Trump is their presumptive nominee, elected officials within the Republican Party are faced with the difficult question of how they should respond. Some are saying it isn’t at all difficult—the people have spoken, by golly!—but I beg to differ. It’s a genuinely hard political question that ought to be framed by philosophical, institutional, and constitutional considerations.
Recently, Justice Stevens gave a speech about Justice Scalia. At the end, Stevens relies upon an argument from historian Joseph Ellis that both Stevens and Ellis believe suggests that Thomas Jefferson was not an originalist. But as Ed Whelan points out, this is a misinterpretation. Jefferson writes: Let us [not] weakly believe that one generation is not as capable as another of taking care of itself, and of ordering its own affairs. Let us, as our sister States have done, avail ourselves of our reason and experience, to correct the crude essays of our first and unexperienced, although wise, virtuous, and…
Late last week, a panel of the D.C. Circuit dinged Amtrak for the second time. The case (Association of American Railroads v. Department of Transportation) involves several constitutional questions regarding Amtrak’s funky set-up and operation. Herewith a few preliminary words on one of them: delegation and due process.
The Constitution permits Congress to do amazing stuff to the independent judiciary. It can withhold jurisdiction, or yank jurisdiction that’s been given. It can change the law for pending cases. It can legislate for a “legitimate class of one.” But suppose Smith sues Jones in federal court and Congress enacts a law saying, “In Smith v. Jones [docket number], Smith wins.” Constitutional? An ancient, messy case, U.S. v. Klein (1872), seems to say “no.” After Wednesday’s decision in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, the answer may be “yes.” I’ve written about the case before: The outcome is more depressing than I had apprehended.
The fundamental constitutional question presented by the case of United States v. Texas is not whether the President is constitutionally required to enforce immigration laws (he is), but whether the Supreme Court is constitutionally empowered to police every constitutional dispute. If it decides to do the work of Congress and restrain the executive, it will, more than it did in Cooper v. Aaron (1958), proclaim a doctrine of judicial supremacy over constitutional questions.