A good explanation of the Clinton-Trump clash we are living through, and of Trump’s having taken the Republican Party by storm, is in Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule’s 2010 brief for executive supremacy as the way we do constitutionalism. The Posner-Vermeule thesis in The Executive Unbound is that the Madisonian philosophy of separation of powers as a constraint on the presidency no longer exists, and good riddance. The more authoritative check on executive power, they say, is majority opinion and the fact that the President must face the voters every four years. This, and not Greg Weiner’s paean to Jemmy Madison, is the only source we have now for safe, effective, and informally limited government. Those wanting Madison on demand, Posner and Vermeule inform us, are whistling past the graveyard of a constitutionalism that no longer fits this American nation.
In this year’s presidential campaign, it would be a wonderful contribution to the republic and perhaps a winning move to run credibly on a rule of law platform. This kind of platform is to be distinguished from a “law and order” one, because it emphasizes that in a well-ordered republic that government must enforce order only through law. And this slogan also underscores that the problem we face is not simply or indeed mainly lawlessness on the streets, but lawlessness in government. Respect for law must begin at the top.
Now that Donald Trump is their presumptive nominee, elected officials within the Republican Party are faced with the difficult question of how they should respond. Some are saying it isn’t at all difficult—the people have spoken, by golly!—but I beg to differ. It’s a genuinely hard political question that ought to be framed by philosophical, institutional, and constitutional considerations.
Recently, Justice Stevens gave a speech about Justice Scalia. At the end, Stevens relies upon an argument from historian Joseph Ellis that both Stevens and Ellis believe suggests that Thomas Jefferson was not an originalist. But as Ed Whelan points out, this is a misinterpretation. Jefferson writes: Let us [not] weakly believe that one generation is not as capable as another of taking care of itself, and of ordering its own affairs. Let us, as our sister States have done, avail ourselves of our reason and experience, to correct the crude essays of our first and unexperienced, although wise, virtuous, and…
Late last week, a panel of the D.C. Circuit dinged Amtrak for the second time. The case (Association of American Railroads v. Department of Transportation) involves several constitutional questions regarding Amtrak’s funky set-up and operation. Herewith a few preliminary words on one of them: delegation and due process.
The Constitution permits Congress to do amazing stuff to the independent judiciary. It can withhold jurisdiction, or yank jurisdiction that’s been given. It can change the law for pending cases. It can legislate for a “legitimate class of one.” But suppose Smith sues Jones in federal court and Congress enacts a law saying, “In Smith v. Jones [docket number], Smith wins.” Constitutional? An ancient, messy case, U.S. v. Klein (1872), seems to say “no.” After Wednesday’s decision in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, the answer may be “yes.” I’ve written about the case before: The outcome is more depressing than I had apprehended.
The fundamental constitutional question presented by the case of United States v. Texas is not whether the President is constitutionally required to enforce immigration laws (he is), but whether the Supreme Court is constitutionally empowered to police every constitutional dispute. If it decides to do the work of Congress and restrain the executive, it will, more than it did in Cooper v. Aaron (1958), proclaim a doctrine of judicial supremacy over constitutional questions.
Christopher DeMuth, the great conservative authority on regulatory policy, comes to Liberty Law Talk to discuss his recent work on the institutional decline of congress and how it can return to its place of constitutional prominence.
The presidential nominating contests continue to befuddle prognosticators, but the consensus winner of the Syntactical Caucus of 2016 is already in. Whether Republican or Democrat, the next President will almost certainly display an unreasoning proclivity for the first person singular.